The Oslo Accords and the Peace Process

Research and Instructor Guide



Washington, D.C. · 13 September 1993. Vince Musi, White House photograph.

CASE OVERVIEW

Four Outcomes to Explain

Oslo produced mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, a Palestinian interim administration and some Israeli redeployments. The parties missed the intended five-year path to a permanent settlement. Elements of the interim system continued to shape everyday government and Israeli leverage long after the final-status track stalled.

How design and timing interacted

The interim design made an agreement possible on issues the negotiators could address in 1993. On the harder issues it deferred, the parties entered later talks with unequal authority and different expectations for the end state. Israeli governments could authorize or withhold key redeployments. Palestinian leaders faced obligations they controlled only in part, including security cooperation amid opposition and violence. Settlement growth and continued Israeli powers raised the costs of delay for Palestinians. Changes in political leadership, violence and unresolved final terms help explain when these vulnerabilities mattered.

Declaration of Principles, 13 September 1993, Articles I, IV, V and XV · Oslo II text and clause index, PA-X Peace Agreements Database · Chatham House, The Oslo approach, 1993 to 2000 (2018) · Ron Pundak, From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? (2001)

What to measure

Outcome	Evidence and question
Breakthrough	The 1993 exchange of letters and Declaration of Principles. Why did signing become possible at that moment?
Interim implementation	Specific authorities, jurisdictions and scheduled actions. At Wye, which transfers occurred and which actor could withhold the next one?
Permanent settlement	The May 1999 timetable and the 2000–01 negotiating record. Which barriers were built into the process, and which depended on later choices or unresolved terms?
Institutional legacy	The Paris Protocol and dated 2026 fiscal reporting. Why could a temporary mechanism remain consequential after the original deadline?

Israel–PLO recognition letters, 9 September 1993 · Gaza–Jericho Agreement, 4 May 1994, Article XXIII(3) · Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998, complete text and timeline · Israeli–Palestinian joint statement, Taba, 27 January 2001 · UNSCO report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 24 September 2026, §§4 and 4.1

The verdict asks students to explain one dated outcome and separate it from the later evidence of institutional persistence.

HISTORICAL RECORD

Why the Breakthrough Became Possible

The 1993 talks followed a change in the political setting. The First Intifada, which began in 1987, made it harder to treat Palestinian political organization in the occupied territories as peripheral. The PLO's 1988 political turn toward a negotiated settlement and subsequent dialogue with the United States preceded the 1993 exchange. After the Gulf War, the U.S.-led Madrid process in 1991 opened public talks with Israel and a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation. Formally the PLO was outside that delegation. Washington talks continued while a secret channel in Norway brought Israeli and PLO representatives into direct contact.

U.S. Office of the Historian, The Oslo Accords and the Arab–Israeli Peace Process · Wendy Pearlman, Occupation and the First Intifada, 1967–1993 (2011) · Herbert C. Kelman, Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough (1997)

Why the parties used a direct channel

For the PLO leadership, Oslo offered recognition and a route back to governing inside Palestinian territory after diplomatic isolation and weakened leverage following the Gulf War. For Rabin's government, dealing directly with the PLO offered a way to get commitments from an organization with influence over Palestinian political and security decisions. Oslo opened through an unofficial channel and became an authorized negotiation. Secrecy reduced exposure to public vetoes while the framework was taking shape. The same secrecy narrowed consultation with people working the public track and others who would have to live with the agreement.

Chatham House, The Oslo approach, 1993 to 2000 (2018) · Ahmed Qurie, From Oslo to Jerusalem (2006 English edition) · Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace (1995)

Read the exchange as two commitments

On 9 September 1993 Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security, accepted Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, renounced terrorism and other acts of violence and committed the PLO to the process. Rabin's letter, responding to the PLO's undertakings, recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and stated Israel's willingness to negotiate with it. Four days later the Declaration of Principles set out a framework for interim Palestinian self-government and eventual negotiations over permanent status.

Israel–PLO recognition letters, 9 September 1993 · Declaration of Principles, 13 September 1993, Articles I, IV, V and XV

What a facilitator could deliver

Norway provided access, confidentiality and a channel for problem solving. Waage points to limits on Norway's leverage and gaps in the archival record. On 5 November 2026 the Norwegian government and National Archives made additional Oslo-process records public. Use the release to compare drafts with the signed text. Check a draft's author, audience and circulation before treating it as evidence of negotiating intent.

Waage on the missing files (2008) · Norway's release announcement, 5 November 2026 · National Archives of Norway, Oslo process archive

HISTORICAL RECORD

An Interim System with Unequal Powers

The Declaration of Principles committed the parties to interim self-government and permanent-status negotiations. Article V deferred Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders and other issues. The Gaza–Jericho Agreement dates the five-year interim period from signature on 4 May 1994. The original timetable therefore leads to May 1999. It left the final distribution of sovereignty to subsequent talks.

Declaration of Principles, 13 September 1993, Articles I, IV, V and XV · Gaza–Jericho Agreement, 4 May 1994, Article XXIII(3)

Read Areas A B and C as interim jurisdictions

Area	Responsibility in the 1995 agreement
A	After redeployment the Palestinian Council assumed internal security and public order for Palestinians. Palestinian civil powers also applied. Israel retained external security and overall security of Israelis and settlements.
B	Palestinian civil powers and responsibility for Palestinians' public order. The agreement retained overriding Israeli security responsibility for protecting Israelis and confronting terrorism.
C	Israel retained powers pending further transfers or reservation to final talks. Some Palestinian functional powers applied in C. The agreement anticipated further territorial transfers subject to its conditions and matters reserved for permanent status.

Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement, 28 September 1995 · Oslo II, PA-X, Arts. XI–XIII and XVII and Annex III

The settlement question

Oslo II reserved settlements for permanent-status negotiations. Article XXXI(7) directs both sides to refrain from steps changing the status of the West Bank and Gaza pending the outcome. The provision supplies a text for arguments about what kinds of changes the parties had undertaken to avoid. A specific allegation of breach requires an account of the provision, the act and the relevant date. Questions under international humanitarian law have a separate legal basis. The ICJ discusses the relationship between Oslo and applicable international law in paragraph 102 of its 2024 advisory opinion.

Oslo II, Article XXXI(7) · International Court of Justice, advisory opinion, 19 July 2024, §§102, 155 and 285

What sequence was supposed to achieve

Incrementalism was meant to build trust for harder bargains. It could also turn temporary arrangements into a durable division of authority. Palestinian institutions gained responsibilities while Israel kept powers that could alter the conditions for the next bargain. Article XXI allowed negotiation, agreed conciliation and arbitration by consent. Verification, the power to order performance and the capacity to carry it out are three different things.

Oslo II, Articles XXI and XXVI · Nathan J. Brown, Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords (2003) · Robert Powell, War as a Commitment Problem (2006)

HISTORICAL RECORD AND DATA

What the Wye Record Lets Us Test

Wye linked Israeli redeployments to reciprocal steps, including Palestinian security obligations, and provided for joint and U.S.-involved reviews. Its Section IV named 4 May 1999 as the goal for a permanent agreement. On 20 November 1998 Israel carried out the first redeployment. It moved 2% of West Bank territory from C to B and 7.1% from B to A. Each move changed a different set of powers.

Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998, complete text and timeline · UN Division for Palestinian Rights, November 1998 chronology, 19–20 November entries · UN Special Committee report A/54/73, paragraphs 15 and 206

Netanyahu publicly linked further implementation to Palestinian compliance. The 14 December Charter reaffirmation addressed one commitment. A 5% C-to-B transfer scheduled for 18 December did not go ahead. The Israeli Cabinet backed withholding further implementation on 20 December. The parties later rescheduled the outstanding steps at Sharm el-Sheikh. On 10 September 1999, 7% moved from C to B. Compare how governments used their authority and what each treated as sufficient compliance.

Benjamin Netanyahu statement, 13 December 1998 · Bill Clinton, comments on the 14 December 1998 Palestinian vote, 15 December 1998 · UN Special Committee report A/54/73, 1999, paragraphs 204–207 · Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, 4 September 1999 · UN Special Committee, 2000, account of the September 1999 redeployment

Use the same measure in both windows

Year	West Bank outside J1	Jerusalem J1	Total in PCBS series
1988	73,403	117,550	190,953
1993	122,320	146,436	268,756
1998	179,087	162,842	341,929
1999	190,750	170,400	361,150

Outside J1, the count rose by 48,917 residents from 1988 to 1993 and by 56,767 from 1993 to 1998. Proportional growth was about 66.6% and 46.4% respectively, using each window's starting count. Either comparison can earn full credit when the student defines the measure. J1 is the part of Jerusalem governorate annexed by Israel in 1967 in the PCBS geography.

PCBS, Israeli Settlements in the West Bank 2021, Table 6 · PCBS time series by year and region, 1986–2021

Ask what would distinguish explanations

The series counts residents. To assess the contribution of settlement policy, seek implementation dates, land or construction records, and evidence on migration and natural increase. To distinguish compliance concerns from coalition incentives at Wye, compare dated security-review records with public and private decisions on redeployment.

HISTORICAL RECORD

From Camp David to Taba

Treat Camp David, the Clinton Parameters and Taba as different episodes. The issues carried forward, and proposals and responses changed across the dates.

Record	What it establishes	What to verify separately
25 July 2000 Camp David joint statement	The leaders reported unresolved gaps and committed to keep negotiating.	Which proposal was conveyed to whom, the map version and author, and how each party understood the terms.
December 2000 ideas January 2001 responses	Clinton presented parameters and publicly described both responses as acceptance with reservations. The Palestinian negotiating team gave specific questions and objections.	The effect of each reservation on the territory, sovereignty, security and refugee proposals.
27 January 2001 Taba joint statement and non-paper	The delegations jointly reported progress. Moratinos recorded issue-specific areas of agreement and remaining gaps after consulting the parties.	The terms of a signed deal, the ability to secure ratification and the capacity to implement it.

Camp David trilateral statement, 25 July 2000 · Bill Clinton, Israel Policy Forum speech, 7 January 2001 · Palestinian negotiating team, response to Clinton's proposals, 1 January 2001 · Israeli–Palestinian joint statement, Taba, 27 January 2001 · Miguel Moratinos and team, Taba non-paper, Sections 1.1 and 1.3

One issue gives a better test than a headline

The temporary southern route opened on 25 October 1999. A contemporaneous UN report dates the Israeli block on travel to 6 October 2000. Clinton proposed a lasting route in December. The Moratinos account records convergence at Taba on a link, with its operation and sovereignty open. Barak, Malley and Agha, and Pressman offer differing accounts of the wider bargaining record.

Israeli–Palestinian interim Safe Passage Protocol, 5 October 1999 · Clinton Parameters, 23 December 2000, minutes reproduced by FMEP · Moratinos non-paper, §1.3 · Benny Morris interview with Ehud Barak, New York Review of Books, 13 June 2002 · Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, Reply to Ehud Barak, New York Review of Books, 13 June 2002 · Jeremy Pressman, Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba? (2003)

The Second Intifada belongs in the sequence

In late September 2000 Israeli police fired on Palestinian protesters. The Mitchell Committee cited a U.S. account that the police killed four people while dispersing protesters on 29 September. The committee emphasized the role of lethal force in escalation and found insufficient evidence for an advance plan by either leadership. Talks resumed amid the uprising.

Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report), 30 April 2001 · Israeli–Palestinian joint statement, Taba, 27 January 2001

PERSPECTIVES

What the Participants and Critics Saw

Israeli leaders who made Oslo

Rabin's public case in 1993 was about ending conflict through a step that could be implemented with the PLO. In October 1995 his Knesset speech envisioned a Palestinian entity "less than a state" and articulated Israeli preferences on Jerusalem and a security border in the Jordan Valley. Give that speech its date and audience. It is evidence of Rabin's stated destination in 1995. Ron Pundak, an Israeli participant in the secret channel, later argued that peace was possible and traced errors in implementation and bargaining that undermined the opportunity.

White House signing ceremony transcript, 13 September 1993 · Yitzhak Rabin, Knesset ratification speech, 5 October 1995 · Ron Pundak, From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? (2001)

Palestinian leaders and critics

Arafat framed the agreement as an opening toward coexistence and political rights. The memoir of Ahmed Qurie, the PLO negotiator in the secret channel, shows the choices the leadership faced in trying to gain Israeli recognition and a territorial foothold. Hanan Ashrawi's account from the Madrid and Washington track opens a different window on the same process, including its leadership and representational tensions. Edward Said's critique in October 1993 identified a structural danger early. He expected the PLO to take administrative responsibility while deferring the issues on which an end to occupation depended.

White House signing ceremony transcript, 13 September 1993 · Ahmed Qurie, From Oslo to Jerusalem (2006 English edition) · Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace (1995) · Edward Said, The Morning After, London Review of Books, 21 October 1993

Opponents and sources of political pressure

Israeli opposition included settlement constituencies and politicians who contested territorial transfers and the security assumptions underpinning them. Netanyahu's government also negotiated new interim agreements, including Wye. An Israeli settler's massacre of Palestinian worshippers in Hebron, Rabin's assassination by an Israeli extremist, and attacks on Israeli civilians by Palestinian armed groups all belong in the chronology. Hamas opposed the Oslo process. Baconi helps situate that opposition and later political engagement. Use specific actors and actions when analyzing the effect of violence on public confidence and coalition survival.

UN Security Council Resolution 904, 18 March 1994 · UN Division for Palestinian Rights, Origins and Evolution, Part V · Tareq Baconi, The Demise of Oslo and Hamas's Political Engagement (2015) · Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, Sabotaging the Peace (2002) · Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998, complete text and timeline

Mediators also wrote rival accounts

Waage questions how much a mediator with limited leverage could do. Dennis Ross, Malley and Agha disagree about what the parties signaled in the closing talks. Aaron David Miller later criticized U.S. closeness to Israel. Evaluate each account's timing, vantage point and intended audience against dated proposals and joint records.

Waage on the Norwegian archive · Ross, Malley and Agha exchange (2001) · Miller on U.S. mediation (2005)

Mechanisms and Their Evidence

These explanations can operate together. Ask which best accounts for a particular outcome and time. A strong answer points to an observation on which two accounts would disagree.

Explanation	Mechanism to trace	Evidence that would sharpen the comparison
Incremental bargaining	Early recognition and transfers lower the cost of cooperating on harder issues.	Repeated, verified performance is followed by larger or more credible concessions. Wye's first phase and the renewed timetable matter.
Unequal leverage and commitment	An actor retains authority over a future step. Changing payoffs make its original promise less credible.	Withholding occurs where one actor controls delivery and penalties or remedies are weak. Compare the same obligation across different leaders and political conditions.
Shocks and political incentives	Violence or changes of leadership alter voter beliefs, coalitions or the risk attributed to the deal.	Use decisions, statements or polling at the time. Look for a visible change in policy or support after the shock and consider other simultaneous changes.
Final terms and ratification	Proposals on sovereignty, refugees, settlements, Jerusalem or security exceed what negotiators or their constituencies can accept.	Track one provision across dated documents. Test whether convergence on a principle also includes authority, enforceable terms and coalition support.
Durable interim rule	Palestinian administrative capacity and continued Israeli control become linked through recurring decisions such as revenue transfers.	Trace a concrete administrative dependency across governments and dates. Distinguish an institutional legacy from an inference about initial intentions.
Mediation and information	Private channels allow exploratory bargains. Monitoring and diplomacy affect what actors know and the cost of reneging.	Compare private drafts and public positions. Identify what the mediator could verify and which party could compel performance.

Herbert C. Kelman, Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough (1997) · Robert Powell, War as a Commitment Problem (2006) · Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, Sabotaging the Peace (2002) · Jeremy Pressman, Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba? (2003) · Hilde Henriksen Waage, Postscript to Oslo: The Mystery of Norway's Missing Files (2008) · Sara Roy, De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo (1999)

Said, Roy and Farsakh examine asymmetric administration. Brown traces Palestinian institution-building within it. Use these accounts to ask whose authority persisted.

Said (1993) · Roy (1999) · Farsakh (2021) · Brown (2003)

INSTITUTIONAL LEGACY

Why the Fiscal Arrangement Still Matters

The 1994 Paris Protocol makes it possible to trace a surviving institution through a specific chain. In Article III(15), clearance of import taxes follows the goods' final destination. The system developed with Israel collecting significant revenues on behalf of the Palestinian Authority for subsequent transfer. The PA draws on those funds for recurrent costs, including salaries and services. A government can thus acquire administrative obligations before it gains dependable control of key revenue streams.

Paris Protocol, 29 April 1994, Article III(15) · World Bank, Palestinian Economic Update, May 2026, fiscal developments

Read the 2026 records at their dates

Source and period	What it establishes for this exercise
World Bank, May 2026	The PA was relying on arrears, domestic bank borrowing and partial salary payments. The World Bank identifies the suspension of transfers and limited alternatives in its fiscal analysis.
UN Trade and Development, September 2026	The report describes transfers as fully withheld from May 2025 through mid-2026. Treat that as the measured interval for this claim.
UNSCO, 24 September 2026	Sections 4 and 4.1 place the fiscal pressure in an interim economic and administrative framework with Israeli-retained powers. The report discusses the PA's service capacity.

World Bank, Palestinian Economic Update, May 2026, fiscal developments · UN Trade and Development, September 2026 reporting on Palestinian public finances · UNSCO report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 24 September 2026, §§4 and 4.1 · Norway, Chair's Summary of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meeting, 24 September 2026

Distinguish an institutional channel from the full crisis

The Paris Protocol identifies the original mechanism. Fiscal reports connect withheld revenue to constraints on PA funding. They also describe economic damage, restricted economic activity and financing pressures. A causal explanation needs to specify which outcome it addresses, such as partial salaries, and what else contributed. The same approach lets students explain a continuing dependency without inferring that the negotiators of 1993 intended each later result.

Put the legal material in the right place

The ICJ's July 2024 advisory opinion addresses the effect of Oslo (§102), forcible transfer (§147), violence against Palestinians (§154), settlements (§155), prohibited separation (§229) and the unlawfulness of Israel's continued presence (§285). Its conclusions concern state conduct and duties. Individual criminal liability is decided in separate proceedings.

ICJ advisory opinion, July 2024, §§102, 155 and 285 · Case record and separate opinions

ASSIGNMENT DESIGN

Writing and Assessment

Students move from a forecast based on the 1993 record to an implementation audit, a comparison of final-status evidence and a verdict. Each round displays its questions and writing minimum before students open the records.

Round	Target	Evidence of understanding
1993 forecast	85–100	A forecast that could be tested, based on the signed text and a second contemporaneous record.
1994–99 audit	125–150	A transfer and a withheld step, the relevant authority, competing explanations and a consistent population comparison.
2000–01 talks	90–110	A comparison of C2 and C3 that weighs movement on passage against the unresolved terms.
2026 verdict	250–290	A dated outcome, a rival and reconsidered forecast, plus the fiscal mechanism and the public-finding hypothetical.

Allow about 70–85 minutes. The target is 550–650 words with at least 500 across the case. The first three minimums are 65, 100 and 75 words. The final minimum is 220 or the number still needed to reach 500, whichever is higher. The HTML displays the calculated minimum and excludes bracket citations from the new word counts.

Run the assessment

Share the HTML file for students to open in a browser. The case and writing tools work offline. Original sources open separately. Students preview each response before recording it, then retain it as read-only when the next round opens. In the verdict they can consult all earlier records and responses.

For Class requires all four responses and unlocks print, download, and copy options after submission checks. The response editor gently blocks outside pastes and allows students to move text copied or cut from the same response. For Fun allows pasted text and ends with an on-screen practice review. Both modes support backup and restore.

Debrief the judgments

Compare two students who reach different verdicts. Ask which outcome each explains, when its proposed cause operated, and what evidence would change their ranking of the explanations.

ASSESSMENT

Marking the Evidence of Understanding

Score each dimension from 0 to 4, for 20 points total. Use 3 for sound performance and 4 for performance that tests an inference. A 2 shows a partially supported answer, a 1 leaves a central error or an unsupported conclusion and a 0 supplies no usable evidence on that dimension.

Criterion	3 Sound	4 Strong
Chronology and authority	Identifies dates, the actor with authority, and the relevant outcome.	Shows how timing or unequal authority changes the inference.
Source judgment	Cites specific evidence and treats it as agreement, statement, reconstruction or observed outcome.	Weighs records that support different inferences and explains how genre, scope or date affects the comparison.
Quantitative reasoning	Uses accurate figures, units, dates and geography. Gives the starting value for a percentage.	Explains what the measure captures and what additional evidence would test a stronger causal claim.
Mechanism and rival	Traces a credible causal chain to a specified outcome and states a plausible rival.	Weighs competing mechanisms using evidence that could distinguish them.
Revision and transfer	Defends or revises an earlier judgment and applies the later evidence and hypothetical.	Explains the scope of the update, what the panel could affect and what still depends on an actor with authority.

Two defensible answers for calibration

Design-centered. A student may explain the missed May 1999 target through unequal control over the steps needed to move beyond interim arrangements. The Wye sequence supplies both cooperation and a later hold. The student should show what evidence could separate an incentive to delay from a dispute about compliance.

Contingency-centered. A student may account for the January 2001 outcome through leadership turnover, violence or substantive bargaining gaps. Changes in implementation across cabinets and movement at Taba can support that account. Ask how it handles the earlier warning from Said and the Cabinet’s continuing control over redeployment.

Calibrate the hypothetical

Wye already provided for security reviews. The hypothetical adds a public, independent finding after the scheduled transfer date passed. It could affect what actors knew before the 20 December hold. The Israeli government would still authorize a redeployment. Score the causal chain the student gives, and use the 2026 record to assess institutional persistence.

SOURCE GUIDE

Sources to Read First

The signed framework

Read the letters separately. Read Articles I, IV, V and XV of the Declaration of Principles, Article XXIII(3) of Gaza–Jericho and Oslo II Articles XI–XIII, XVII, XXI, XXVI and XXXI. Compare the purposes, the actual allocation of powers and the procedures for a dispute.

Israel–PLO recognition letters, 9 September 1993 · Declaration of Principles, 13 September 1993, Articles I, IV, V and XV · Gaza–Jericho Agreement, 4 May 1994, Article XXIII(3) · Oslo II text and clause index, PA-X Peace Agreements Database

The voices at the outset

Read the signing statements next to Said's October essay and Rabin's 1995 Knesset speech. Identify the speaker, audience and type of claim. Qurie and Ashrawi give different views of the Palestinian negotiating experience.

White House signing ceremony transcript, 13 September 1993 · Edward Said, The Morning After, London Review of Books, 21 October 1993 · Yitzhak Rabin, Knesset ratification speech, 5 October 1995 · Ahmed Qurie, From Oslo to Jerusalem (2006 English edition) · Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace (1995)

Implementation and the settlement series

Pair the Wye annex with the November and December records and the 1999 rescheduling. Check the population series in one column from start to end. For scholarly interpretations read Pundak, Kydd and Walter, and Roy alongside the data.

Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998, complete text and timeline · UN Division for Palestinian Rights, November 1998 chronology, 19–20 November entries · UN Special Committee report A/54/73, 1999, paragraphs 204–207 · Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, 4 September 1999 · PCBS, Israeli Settlements in the West Bank 2021, Table 6 · Ron Pundak, From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? (2001) · Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, Sabotaging the Peace (2002) · Sara Roy, De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo (1999)

The permanent status record

Use the Camp David joint statement, Clinton's January remarks, the Palestinian response, and the Taba joint statement and non-paper before reading the retrospective accounts. Pressman offers a research-based comparison of the proposals and positions. The Mitchell Report supplies a distinct record of escalating violence.

Camp David trilateral statement, 25 July 2000 · Clinton Parameters, 23 December 2000, minutes reproduced by FMEP · Bill Clinton, Israel Policy Forum speech, 7 January 2001 · Palestinian negotiating team, response to Clinton's proposals, 1 January 2001 · Israeli–Palestinian joint statement, Taba, 27 January 2001 · Taba documentary record, Journal of Palestine Studies (2002) · Jeremy Pressman, Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba? (2003) · Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report), 30 April 2001

The present and the new archive

Read Paris Article III(15) with the May and September 2026 fiscal records. Keep dates attached to the finding on withheld transfers. The 2024 ICJ opinion supplies legal context. Norway's November 2026 release is an opportunity to compare newly available drafts with public commitments and prior historical accounts.

Paris Protocol, 29 April 1994, Article III(15) · World Bank, Palestinian Economic Update, May 2026, fiscal developments · UNSCO report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 24 September 2026, §§4 and 4.1 · UN Trade and Development, September 2026 reporting on Palestinian public finances · ICJ advisory opinion, July 2024 · Norwegian archive release, November 2026 · Waage on archival gaps

REVISION RECORD

Pressure Test and Improvement Plan

Six simulated reviewers walked through the first two editions. The review combined student writing, historical source and rubric review, and execution of the workflow in a document fixture.

Priority	What the test exposed	Revision and retest
1 · Protect writing	Opening an earlier round in a stale tab could erase newer text. A corrupted draft was silently replaced. An earlier report could still print after a different backup was opened.	Keep both draft copies recoverable and clear the old print view when a new draft opens. The retest confirmed these behaviors across stale tabs, overlapping imports, reset and partial-draft recovery.
2 · Improve the evidence task	One Taba answer could be copied from the supplied record. The verdict gave students an ambiguous date for the outcome they had to explain.	Weigh the passage evidence and choose a dated outcome to explain. A design-centered answer on May 1999 and a contingency-centered answer on January 2001 both fit all target ranges and earned simulated full credit.
3 · Make writing easier to manage	A simulated student met the final round's target of 250 words and was still 10 words short overall. Returning from a long record meant searching for the draft.	Show the effective minimum, preview before recording, and link records to writing in both directions. The retest resumed an interrupted draft and checked the report boundary at 499 and 500 words.
4 · Improve grading signals	The app issued a report for repeated text and listed all supplied cards under each answer.	Require specified citations and list those the student entered. The uncited attempt stopped. A 516-word response with citations still earned a simulated 6 out of 20 for weak reasoning.

Check the classroom handoff

Have a student open the distributed file, draft a paragraph, return after an interruption and submit one report from a phone or laptop. Check that the prompts come first, the draft returns and the report has all four entries. The technical retest passed 17 scenario groups in a document fixture. Native mobile layout, screen-reader output and the PDF dialog need a live check.

REVISION REVIEW

Third Edition Comparison

Six independent simulated reviewers used the same criteria on the original, the second edition, and the illustrated third edition before and after its final revisions. Each criterion is rated out of 10. The averages weight the eight criteria equally.

Criterion	First	Second	Third draft	Third revised
Historical accuracy	8.0	8.8	9.3	9.7
Standalone context	5.5	6.5	8.5	9.4
Documentary integrity	6.0	6.5	9.0	9.5
First-use clarity	5.0	7.0	9.0	9.5
Causal rigor	6.5	8.5	9.0	9.5
Visual communication	4.5	5.5	8.6	9.0
Navigation and accessibility	5.0	7.5	8.4	9.1
Save and export reliability	5.5	8.0	8.5	9.3
Average	**5.8**	**7.3**	**8.8**	**9.4**

Before final revisions · Third draft 8.8, second 7.3, first 5.8.
After final revisions · Third revised 9.4, second 7.3, first 5.8.

What changed after the draft review

The background is reachable from the cover. The materials define annexation in place and distinguish the PLO negotiators from the Palestinian Authority administrators. The passage exercise brings in observed opening and closure. The Wye exercise identifies each reported rationale and the evidence that could test it.

The five original prints carry subject-specific illustration captions. The evidence views use readable tables, numeric labels or text equivalents. Manual export remains available when a download fails, and resetting or restoring clears the previous draft’s export view.

What the retest verified

The cold replay completed all four rounds offline, including a midpoint reload, with 603 words intact. Two well-supported arguments scored about 19/20, and a superficial response with valid citations scored about 6/20. Two fresh passage arguments also reached the report with different, evidence-based judgments.

All 17 workflow scenarios and 12 targeted assertions passed in document fixtures. These covered stale resets, overlapping restores, failed downloads, text-copy recovery and clearing prior exports. The art was inspected and the responsive rules reviewed. Live phone rendering, screen-reader output and the native PDF dialog need direct checking.

SOURCE CHECKS

Evidence Added in the Third Edition

Background and recognition

The orientation dates displacement, Israeli military occupation and diplomacy. Israeli forces' expulsion of residents from Lydda is one documented case within the broader Palestinian displacement of 1948. The 1993 letters show the scope of each recognition separately. Resolution 338 calls for a ceasefire, implementation of Resolution 242 and negotiations.

United Nations, history of the question of Palestine · UNRWA, Palestine refugees · Martin Kramer, What Happened at Lydda, reconstruction using Israeli military records · UN Security Council Resolution 446 (1979) · UN Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) · Israel–PLO recognition letters, 9 September 1993 · UN Security Council Resolution 338 (1973)

Documented harm and responsibility

UNRWA records Baruch Goldstein's killing of 29 Palestinian worshippers at Hebron and reports that Israeli security forces killed 12 more Palestinians in the following hours. The U.S. report records Hamas's claim of responsibility for the 1996 bus bombing. The Mitchell report attributes the September 2000 shootings to Israeli police and evaluates claims about advance plans.

UNRWA Commissioner-General's 1994 report, paragraph 21 · UN Security Council Resolution 904, 18 March 1994 · U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996 · Mitchell Committee report, April 2001, Yale Avalon Project

Agreements and their implementation

For Wye, match the 1999 target and dated commitments to the implementation record. The UN committee's summary of press reporting is an attributed account of U.S. officials' views about Netanyahu's motives. For passage, compare the signed protocol, observed use and closure, and the later proposal and reconstruction.

Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998, complete text and timeline · UN Special Committee report A/54/73, 1999, paragraphs 204–207 · Signed Safe Passage Protocol, October 1999, section 2 · United Nations, historical chronology of the passage opening, note 170 · UN Special Coordinator, impact of mobility restrictions, September–November 2000 · Miguel Moratinos and team, Taba non-paper, Sections 1.1 and 1.3

Legal findings and fiscal effects

The 2024 ICJ advisory opinion finds breaches concerning forcible transfer, settler violence, settlements and near-complete separation of settlers and Palestinians. Cite the specific finding and the kind of proceeding. The 2026 reports identify Israeli withholding and consequences for Palestinian services, alongside trade and financial constraints.

International Court of Justice advisory opinion, paragraphs 102, 147, 154–155, 229 and 285 · United Nations committee report A/81/35, 2026 · World Bank, Palestinian Economic Update, May 2026, fiscal developments · UNSCO report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 24 September 2026, §§4 and 4.1

REVISION REVIEW

Four Edition Comparison

Six fresh simulated reviewers worked from arbitrarily labeled files in varied order. They assigned their baseline scores before seeing the revised file. Reviewers could see design differences. The scores are judgments on a 10-point scale, and the averages weight all criteria equally.

Criterion	First	Second	Third	Fourth
Historical accuracy	8.5	9.1	9.4	9.6
Documentary integrity	7.8	8.5	9.0	9.5
Historical context	6.6	7.4	9.2	9.5
First-use clarity	6.5	8.0	9.0	9.5
Standalone use	7.5	8.5	9.0	9.5
Causal rigor	6.8	8.5	9.1	9.4
Assessment usability	6.4	8.3	8.8	9.3
Oslo-specific art	0.0	0.0	4.0	9.0
Visual communication	4.0	5.0	7.0	8.5
Navigation and accessibility	6.0	8.4	9.0	9.3
Save and export reliability	4.0	7.0	9.0	9.5
Average	**5.8**	**7.2**	**8.4**	**9.3**

Why the visuals changed

The earlier illustrations made the case look cohesive. The damaged table implied a verdict. The red line suggested one border, and the broken bridge suggested a structure. The revised cover uses the ceremony photograph and separates the dated letters from the public signing. Each round uses dated summaries linked to the record for that claim.

What the retest covered

The opposing sample arguments still complete the case. The Wye prompt now asks what a finding would have to show to distinguish two explanations. The workflow checks exercised legacy draft conflicts, denied-storage resets, restore and record focus. The visual review used the embedded photo, markup, and responsive rules. Native mobile layout, screen-reader output, and the PDF dialog still require direct checks.

VISUAL SOURCES

What Each Visual Shows

Cover

The September 13 ceremony at the White House made the interim declaration public. The letters are dated September 9. The photo shows a ceremonial handshake.

Vince Musi, White House photograph, NARA 1985480

Round 1

The letters record different commitments. Keep the recipients and subjects visible, and follow A2 for the issues left to permanent-status talks.

Israel–PLO recognition letters

Round 2

The Wye sequence separates the scheduled, implemented, missed, and rescheduled transfers. Area labels refer to powers and the percentages are of the whole West Bank. The initial and later actions use the same scale.

Wye River Memorandum and scheduled implementation

Round 3

The first two tiles record operation and blockage of the temporary Erez–Tarqumiya route. The remaining tiles distinguish the December proposal and January discussion. The 2000 UN report dates the blockage to October 6.

UN Special Coordinator, September–November 2000

Round 4

The Paris Protocol explains the tax rule. The 2026 documents separately identify Israeli withholding and pressures on wages and services, alongside other financial constraints.

Paris Protocol, Article III(15)